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Abstract 
  
Current analyses of the so-called "neoconservative" turn in US foreign 
policy tend to neglect its economic requirements and consequences.  
This is probably due to their long-run and uncertain nature, and yet one 
expects the foreign policy choices of a global power to be made with a 
clear understanding of their probable long-run economic costs and  
sustainability. The economic implications of unilateralism for the US 
may be complex and may stretch far beyond the accounting of the 
Afghan and Iraq campaign. The phenomenon that we should examine, if 
unilateralism is going to be a lasting choice, is a return to huge external 
borrowing requirement since Reagan’s “Star Wars” programme. The 
paper, intended for a non-economist readership, seeks to ascertain 
whether the ensuing scenario will be stable and sustainable from two 
interrelated perspectives. The first one draws together the various 
possible consequences suggested by standard international economic 
analysis. The second one is a historical-comparative analysis of the 
position of the US in the present global economic system vis-à-vis the 
previous experiences of Great Britain before World War I, and the US 
after Wordl War II. 
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THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF MR. G. W. BUSH’S 
FOREIGN POLICY. CAN THE US AFFORD IT? 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Substantial agreement exists that the Bush Administration has 
announced, and is undertaking, a major shift in the international policy 
of the United States aimed at the unilateral exercise of global power 
according to an extensive definition of “national interest” and “national 
security”, inclusive of the establishment of the “world democratic order” 
by means of armed force. This new strategy is considered to be inspired 
by the so-called “neoconservative” doctrine, which stresses the right and 
power of the US to lead the politics of the free world, with no permanent 
commitments towards, and constraints by, multilateral organizations. 
What has an economist to say about this new international policy stance 
of the US?  
It is well known to economists, as well as to political scientists of 
almost all persuasions, that economic and political choices are 
intimately related. Very generally speaking, the influence of the 
economy on the political sphere can be traced back to two main factors: 
motivations −whether “need” or “greed” −  that induce political choices, 
and constraints that set limits on political choices (Gilpin (2003)). While 
much debate focuses on the former factor − e.g. control over oil 
production and other vested interests of major Bush’s supporters − in 
this paper attention will be drawn to the role of the economy as a 
constraint on political choices. 
According to a well-known definition, economics is the science of 
allocation of scarce resources to alternative ends in society. This 
definition concerns more a method than a specific matter of analysis, 
and a method can, in principle at least, be applied to different matters. 
Indeed, there are many social situations − though not all of them − 
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where the scarcity of resources with respect to competing ends raises 
difficult choice problems. In most such cases, the real value added of 
economics is negative and consists in pointing out the expected 
implications of different courses of action, and hence the limits to 
feasible choices. On the other hand, the extent of economic resources 
and the extent of power are often interrelated, and each may be 
instrumental to expanding the other. Thus, a politician may use his/her 
power to relax economic constraints on his/her set of feasible choices; 
and if political power is considerable, the politician may be tempted to 
believe that economic constraints are negligible. History, as we shall 
see, suggests that this belief is groundless even for international “super-
powers”. There is, however, a specific dimension of economic constraints 
that may justify the attitude of politicians to ignore them: namely that 
these constraints typically unfold over time − technically speaking they 
are “intertemporal” constraints. As a consequence, they may be difficult 
to predict and appraise, and, what is more intriguing,  the expected 
horizon of the politician’s political life may be shorter than the time 
taken for the constraints to materialize. Thus, the unsustainability of 
seemingly grand and successful political designs may harm society a 
few generations later, and possibly fall on the shoulders of a different 
political party. 
 The so-called “New Political Economics” (see e.g. Persson and 
Tabellini (1990)), with its distinctive sceptical attitude towards the 
economic rationality of democracy, views the (self-interested) myopia of 
policy makers as a major flaw in democratic systems based on 
predictable majority reversals. Advocates of this view suggest two 
remedies. The first is “tying governments’ hands” by means of 
constitutional rules embodying the interests of yet-to-be-born 
constituencies. The second is exposing governments to the “constituency 
of markets” too (by e.g. allowing free capital movements) on the grounds 
that “markets” are particularly skilful in intertemporal calculation and 
are able to anticipate the effects of right constraints in real time. 
 All the foregoing considerations contribute to make the economic 
analysis of the new US international political stance a serious and 
challenging matter. The US Administration does enjoy political power 
in the international arena to an unprecedented extent. This power 
indeed relaxes some economic constraints that other “ordinary” 
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countries face. On the other hand, the American democratic system is 
such that majority reversals are frequent and predictable, whereas 
constitutional protections against governments’ short-termism are not 
particularly strong (they are in fact much weaker than those contained 
in the EU Maastricht Treaty and Stability and Growth Pact). Nor do 
super-national regulations of such a nature exist. The exposure of US 
governments to markets is high, but the faith in markets as far-sighted 
real-time voters is no longer as great as it used to be.  Hence, if one 
considers whether the new US international policy stance has been 
tested against its long-run economic feasibility, not only does one realize 
that the Administration seems to have paid remarkably scant attention 
to this dimension in the public debate, but one is also led to suspect that  
little pressure is felt to focus on it1. 
 The non-economist reader will find in section 2 a quick guide to 
the international economic constraints that a country operating in free 
and integrated world markets faces. The simple indicators presented in 
section 2 focus on the long-run sustainability of a country’s 
international position. Section 3 will enlarge the picture, providing a 
few basic insights into the domestic as well as international economic 
implications of international political choices. The key message is that 
the feasibility of these choices can be ranked according to their 
consistency with the long-run sustainability of the ensuing economic 
implications. These basic principles will be seen in action in section 4, 
which examines two major historical antecedents when a single country 
ruled the political-economic world system of capitalist countries, Great 
Britain from 1870 to 1915 and the US from 1945 to 1973. The purpose of 
these historical comparisons is to highlight patterns of world political-
economic governance which should not and cannot be mechanically 
applied to the present situation of the US, but can offer better guidance 
in gauging the long-run feasibility of the neoconservative strategy than 
mere (unreliable) projections of the costs of wars. This assessment 
exercise will be presented in section 5, drawing attention to the present 
world debtor position and international financial phase of the US 
                                                
1 The resignation of Paul O’Neill from the Treasury, which seems motivated by 
most of the concerns raised in this paper, has apparently had no substantial 
impact on the political-economic line of the Administration. 
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economy. This position is at odds with succesful antecedents and 
appears highly problematic for the neoconservative programme for two 
reasons: one is that considerations of international financial stability 
leave too little room for the large fiscal deficits and external borrowing 
required by the programme; the other is that high external debt is 
hardly consistent with the “free-hand”, unconditioned exercise of 
political will invoked by the neconservatives. Section 6 will present a 
few concluding remarks. 
 
2. International economic constraints 
 
 In this section I will point out a few concepts that define the 
basic international economic constraints faced by countries operating in 
integrated world markets. 
 Traditionally, the key issue in a long-run perspective is under 
what conditions each country brings its worldwide transactions in goods 
and assets into balance, which is known as the “balance-of-payments 
(BOP) constraint”. Apparently, this is nothing but the worldwide 
application of the principle of equal exchange which requires any 
individual (country) to meet payments with receipts. Note, however, 
that it is the existence of nation-states with monetary sovereignty and 
different legal tenders − two facts hard to accommodate in the pure 
theory of value and exchange − that introduces the specific dimension of 
international economic constraints which we will consider. Indeed, it is 
monetary sovereigns who directly perceive the BOP constraint, whereas 
private agents may only face it to the extent that monetary authorities 
are willing or able to enforce it.2 Let me now recall how this 
responsibility is exerted. 
Different legal tenders force private agents to trade them in 
order to be able to pay for cross-border transactions. The development of 
international trade requires the parallel development of markets for 
                                                
2 At the individual level, where goods are bought and sold, and the unit of 
account in which they are quoted, is, or should be, immaterial. If a household 
sells labour “at home” but buys goods “abroad” it may well keep its private 
budget in equilibrium, whereas its country records a BOP disequilibrium. 
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currencies granting convertibility and efficient exchange-rates 
quotations (i.e the prices at which currencies are traded against each 
other).  
Table 1. International accounting 
Receipts Payments 
Trade (X) 
Exports of goods and services Imports of goods and services 
Incomes and transfers (YF) 
Labour and capital incomes from 
non-residents 
Unilateral transfers and non-market 
obligations towards non-residents 
Labour and capital incomes to non-
residents 
Unilateral transfers and non-market 
obligations from non-residents 
Capitals (K) 
Sales of assets to non-residents 
(“capital inflows”) 
Purchases of assets from non-
residents (“capital ouflows”) 
 
Total supply of foreign currency 
 
Total demand of foreign currency 
 
“Fundamental” balance of payments 
 
The demand for foreign currency in one country is determined by 
the sum of external payments, while the supply of the same foreign 
currency is determined by the sum of external receipts3. Usually, 
external transactions are recorded under three different categories, as 
in the table above. The important differences between them will become 
clear in due course.  The net balance between supply of and demand for 
foreign currency corresponds to the so-called “fundamental” BOP, which 
is the result of all autonomous international transactions by the private 
and public sectors other than monetary authorities. In what follows, 
this will be our measure of BOP. 
                                                
3 This principle of course applies to the currency of each of a given country’s 
trade partners. For simplicity, I shall consider all external partners to be a 
single entity with a single currency. 
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In the short run, the demand for and supply of foreign currency 
may happen to be different (or equivalently, BOP ≠ 0). Two different 
mechanisms may then be triggered. The first is that the monetary 
authority absorbs excess demand or supply at the current exchange rate 
by reducing or increasing its own stock of foreign currency reserves or 
other compensatory items under its control (“fixed exchange-rate 
regime”). In algebraic form, taking the net balance of each international 
account, 
(1) Xt + YFt + Kt = ∆ORt 
where ∆ORt > 0 is an increase, and ∆ORt < 0 a decrease, in official 
reserves.    
 Alternatively, the monetary authority may let the exchange rate 
float (“floating exchange-rate regime”), in which case excess demand for 
foreign currency brings about domestic currency depreciation (the price 
of foreign currency rises), while excess supply brings about appreciation 
(the price of foreign currency falls). Exchage-rate adjustments are 
generally allowed for on the expectation that they will help rebalance 
international accounts spontaneously. Again using relationship (1), 
Xt + YFt + Kt > 0, ∆ORt = 0,  ⇒ appreciation 
Xt + YFt + Kt < 0, ∆ORt = 0,  ⇒ depreciation 
Yet reserves cannot be increased or decreased, nor can the 
domestic currency depreciate or appreciate, indefinitely. Hence, 
whatever the choice of exchange-rate regime, monetary sovereignty in 
an integrated world economy implies that external payments and 
receipts are sooner or later brought into balance. Consequently, the 
usual expression for the BOP constraint is 
(2) Xt + YFt + Kt = 0 
At first sight, this constraint can be fulfilled by  various 
combinations of the various accounts. However, in order to understand 
the evolution of international payments and the time profile of their 
constraint, it is necessary to examine the three different categories of 
international transactions more closely. As can be seen in Table 1, they 
have quite different economic nature in relation to time. 
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The trade account concerns transactions in goods and services. 
These may be regarded as having negligible intertemporal 
repercussions, in the sense that they are performed within their 
accounting period and give rise to no commitments beyond it. When 
General Motors sell cars to Europe, these are generally paid for in cash 
or with negligible delay4, and the relationship between the US and the 
EU is concluded.  At the opposite end of the spectrum lie transactions 
on capital account, which by their very nature establish commitments 
extending into the distant future. If General Motors sell bonds to 
European savers, the concomitant capital inflow is still recorded as a 
current US receipt, but the US are also indebted with the EU to the 
amount of principal and interests. This counterpart of today’s financial 
transaction will show up in tomorrow’s payments on incomes account 
when GM  services its debt to EU bond-holders. Of course, the reverse 
holds for the EU, which records capital outflows today but will receive 
more foreign incomes tomorrow. Thus, the incomes account is largely 
predetermined by previous foreign assets and liabilities and arises from 
international market obligations (except for labour incomes, which 
depend on migration flows and remittances). This account is usually 
integrated with unilateral transfers and non-market obligations: that is, 
private and public commitments towards and from non-residents, such 
as international grants and aid, participations in international 
institutions, military expenditure abroad. Since trade, incomes and 
transfer payments result from transactions that do not change assets or 
liabilities, they can also be aggregated into a single account, the cu ent 
account, as opposed to the capital account, which records transactions 
which change assets or liabilities. Therefore, the same aggregate 
balance of receipts and payments, and even a zero total sum of the BOP, 
may hide marked differences as regards the future evolution of the 
accounts. There are two principal patterns. 
rr
                                                
• The debtor country 
(3) Xt < 0, YFt < 0, Kt > 0 
4 Commercial credit may be extended, but its time-horizon can be considered 
relatively short with respect to the economic phenomena under examination 
here. 
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In this pattern, balance-of-payments equilibrium is the result of 
trade and incomes deficits vis-à-vis capital inflows. The country acts as 
a debtor since capital inflows imply sales of assets and an increase in 
liabilities with non-residents, whereas the trade deficit indicates that 
the country is buying more than it is selling abroad. Because the debtor 
position stretches over time, also the incomes account tends to turn  
negative, owing to the debt service payments. 
• The creditor country 
(4) Xt > 0, YFt > 0, Kt < 0 
This pattern is the reverse of the previous one, in that BOP 
equilibrium is now the result of trade and incomes surpluses with 
capital outflows. The three accounts indicate that the country as a 
whole is lending abroad, hoarding assets towards non-residents, while it 
is selling more goods than it is buying abroad, with positive incomes 
gained from foreign assets. 
 Of course, in spite of the rhetoric of economics and politics, 
countries are not anthropomorphic entities. Their stance on the 
international economic stage is the result of many independent choices 
made by private and public agents. The connection between 
international accounts and national accounts highlights the economic 
forces behind a country taking a debtor or creditor position. Given (after 
tax) gross domestic product Yt, private domestic consumption Ct, 
private domestic investment t, and the government deficit Dt (total 
public expenditure − total tax revenue), the following identity holds, 
I
I
(5) Yt − (Ct + It + Dt) = Xt 
where the sum (Ct + t + Dt) yields the so-called domestic real 
absorption. Therefore, a trade surplus (deficit) arises as the economy 
absorbs less (more) goods and services than it produces, the difference 
being made up by net exports to (imports from) the rest of the world. 
 The financial counterpart of the previous relationship is crucial. 
Note, first, that non-zero private investment and public deficit imply 
that private firms and the government borrow from households. Since 
Yt + YFt yields national income, and the difference Yt + YFt − Ct yields 
private saving St, under BOP equilibrium it follows from (5) and (2) that 
 12
(6) St − ( t + Dt) = Xt + YFt  = − Kt I
I
t
                                                
where the sum ( t + Dt) corresponds to the domestic financial 
absorption. 
 Let us begin with a debtor country and suppose that initially 
YFt = 0. As we know from expression (3), this country will display a 
negative trade account, Xt < 0, and a positive capital account, Kt > 0. 
Expression (6) tells us that in this country private saving, which 
represents the domestic supply of financial resources, falls short of the 
domestic financial absorption5, resulting in a net external borrowing 
requirement covered by capital inflows. As is often said, a debtor 
country − like any debtor indeed − “lives above its own means” by 
absorbing real and financial resources from the rest of the world. By 
contrast, a creditor country “lives below its own means” by transferring 
real and financial resources to the rest of the world, in the sense that 
private saving exceeds the domestic financial absorption, excess saving 
is channeled abroad through capital outflows, Kt < 0, while the 
concomitant excess of domestic production is sold abroad and is 
reflected in a trade surplus, Xt > 0.  
 To conclude this overview of international accounts and 
constraints, it should be stressed that, on closer inspection, even the 
previous patterns of BOP equilibrium may well persist for a long time, 
but they cannot be sustained indefinitely. A critical variable is 
represented by foreign incomes. The reason is that as long as the capital 
account is unbalanced, the country as a whole goes on accruing assets or 
liabilities towards non-residents. Over time, two main consequences 
arise. The first is that, even though Kt and X  were to remain constant, 
YFt would tend to grow larger and larger, whether positive or negative, 
thus bringing overall payments out of balance6. The second consequence 
is due to the elementary financial principle whereby no country can rely 
5 If the government budget is positive, it adds to private saving. 
6 Consider any country facing a world interest rate r. Its yearly incomes 
account is r times its oustanding liabilities/assets. The latter are the sum of 
previous capital inflows/outflows, so that the year incomes account is 
  YFt = rΣKt 
which continues to increase as long as Kt ≠ 0. 
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on indefinite net capital inflows or outflows because the acceptance of 
country-specific assets and liabilities in the world financial markets is 
limited. These markets tend to obey  to portfolio diversification rules 
focused on proportions of country-specific securities related to their 
return-risk profile7.  
Take the case of a debtor country. This country’s securities 
should grow year after year in world portfolios, with a rising risk 
profile. To rebalance portfolios, purchases of these securities are 
reduced so that Kt falls as YFt payments grow mechanically. To sustain 
Kt, financial markets demand a higher interest rate rate or a currency 
appreciation (see fn. 7); but the former measure accelerates the growth 
of YFt payments whereas the latter widens Xt. Therefore, a “mature” 
debtor country tends spontaneously to display a growing negative 
current a count and/or decreasing capital inflows, which is not 
compatible with the BOP constraint. Hence either the debtor develops a 
positive trade account over time or its position is unsustainable in the 
long-run, i.e. 
c
                                                
(7) Xt > 0, YFt < 0, Kt > 0 
 A creditor country has of course a specular evolution, with 
positive YFt payments progressively adding to trade surpluses, so that a 
growing positive current account is typical of a so-called “mature” 
creditor, or international rentier. However, since to any creditor country 
there corresponds a debtor country, the limits to the sustainability of 
debtor positions also set the limits to the sustainability of creditor 
positions. Hence, if a mature debtor must develop a trade surplus, 
r
r
r
r
7 It is worth recalling the simple formula which states that the rate of 
return to a country-specific security i should be  
  i = r − εi + pi 
where  r is the world risk-free rate, εi is the expected rate of currency 
appreciation and pi is its own country-risk premium. Suppose r = 5%, pi = 1% 
and no expected change in the exchange rate, εi = 0. Then, i = 6%. Now 
suppose that pi = 2%. Consequently, either the country-specific return rate 
increases up to i = 7% or foreign investors should expect a currency 
appreciation  εi = 1% (or a combination of the two). The currency appreciation 
is necessary because it increases the take-home value of interest payments. 
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sustainability of world payments implies that a mature creditor must 
accommodate a trade deficit, i.e.  
(8) Xt < 0, YFt > 0, Kt < 0 
It will be observed that, with reference to the patterns of 
payments (3) and (4), “maturity” implies that the sign of the trade 
account in the debtor and creditor country is reversed. There are only 
two ways in which this can be obtained in relation to the exchange-rate 
regime. Under fixed exchange rates, the debtor country should be able 
to raise GDP above domestic real absorption (ore equivalently private 
saving above domestic financial absorption) with the creditor country 
moving in the opposite direction. If the exchange rate is free to float, the 
foregoing adjustment can be accomplished by depreciating the debtor 
country’s currency vis-à-vis the creditor country’s. The timing and 
precision of the co-evolution of debtor and creditor positions is the 
extremely delicate mechanism underlying world economic and financial 
stability. An important conceptual consequence is that if  “equilibrium” 
is to be understood in its strict meaning of indefinitely sustainable 
position, a third pattern of international payments should be 
introduced. 
 
• Full equilibrium 
(9) Xt = 0, YFt = 0, Kt = 0 
This is an ideal benchmark in which all accounts are balanced. 
The economic meaning and relevance of this pattern is conceptual.  
Though full equilibrium is hardly observable in practice, it acts as a 
“gravity centre” around which actual country positions revolve, and, 
more importantly, it represents the benchmark against which they can 
be measured and assessed. The unsustainability of creditor-debtor 
positions can materialize more or less smoothly depending on the 
growth speed of foreign debt, the country-risk assessment, the level of 
world interest rates and exchange-rate expectations (see e.g. the 
formula in fn. 7). Currency crises and BOP crises are typically triggered 
by sudden reversals of capital inflows as foreign investors abruptly 
“discover” that the above ingredients are no longer mutually consistent. 
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The role of expectations is critical, as hey may, rightly or wrongly, 
induce a crisis well before actual figures reveal or justify it. 
 
3. Some economics of international politics 
 
 Let us now move closer to the central topic of this paper, namely 
the interaction between the “hard laws of economics” outlined above and 
a country’s choice of its international political stance. The latter will be 
considered in a highly simplified and stylized way as a country’s ability 
to control external political resources. This ability may acquire a variety 
of nuances, such as “influence”, “leadership”, “hegemony”, 
“imperialism”, etc. Differences among these forms of the exercise of 
international power, albeit important, fall outside the scope of this 
paper. They will instead be examined along a common dimension, that 
is to say the implications of a given international political stance in 
terms of a country’s domestic and international economic pattern. 
 It is well known that a country’s international political status 
does not come as a ‘free lunch’ or by pure political will. It is the long-run 
outcome of a complex mixture of historical pre-conditions and political 
and economic choices. Both private and public economic choices concur 
to determining  a country’s feasible international political stance. For 
instance, the geographical extent of a country’s political influence is 
often dictated by the extent of its “national interests”, which in turn 
depends on the expansion of international trade and finance developed 
by the private sector. The endeavour to protect national interests is 
generally accompanied and enforced by the development of the “foreign 
affairs apparatus” (diplomacy and army), and this in turn implies a 
consistent path of public expenditure both domestically and abroad. 
Note that the problem is wider and deeper than the so-called “war 
finance”, though this may be predominant in some circumstances. 
Likewise, the so-called “costs of the empire” in terms of direct public 
expenditure abroad (see the item “transfers and non-market 
obligations” in ) may be relevant, but it should not be our 
exclusive concern. As seen above, it is the interaction between the long-
run saving and investment choices of the private sector, on the one 
hand, and the budgetary choices of governments, on the other, that 
eventually determines the country’s international economic pattern. 
Table 1
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Thus, an international political stance is feasible as long as it is 
associated with a sus ainable international economic pattern of the 
country. 
t
 A paradigmatic example of modern analysis of the economic 
implications of international political status is provided by Kindleberger 
(1976, 1981), who examined the role of the US in the post-World-War-II 
international order and proposed that it should be defined as one of 
international leadership. Kindleberger pointed out that  sheer will, 
political power, or even command over material and strategic resources 
are not enough in themselves for a country to become an international 
leader. The difference lies in the presence of international responsibility 
among the government's objectives. In other words, an international 
leader must be aware of the external consequences of its actions, must 
be able to include its partners’ benefit among its own targets, and to 
this effect it  must be ready to restrict its set of feasible choices 
according to its international commitments. This general principle is 
shared by a variety of other analyses of international power, not only 
concerning leadership but also hegemony (Kehoane (1980)) or even 
imperialism (Arrighi (1978)). 
The case that Kindleberger took from the economist's tool box is 
the so-called provision of public goods. Defence is the textbook example 
of a public good, and it was indeed the key issue in international politics 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Defence is a public good because everyone 
benefits from it, but no one in isolation has enough resources or 
incentives to pay for it, once account is taken of the fact that if any 
single individual or coalition of individuals pays for defence then it is 
not possible to exclude from the benefits those who have not 
contributed. Hence no one will ever pay for defence on a voluntary basis. 
When the coalition of individuals that we call "the state" exists, the 
solution to the provision of public goods is compulsory contribution 
enforced by law and legal sanction – i.e. taxation. In the post-war 
Western international coalition of states, in the absence of a super-state 
authority, the solution was a type of informal semi-voluntary exchange. 
The leader of the coalition would bear the (bulk of the) costs of defence 
and reap the benefits of leadership. The members of the coalition would 
enjoy defence with limited loss of sovereignty and minimal waste of 
resources. Total security supply would be maximized, total defence 
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expenditure would be minimized. If, drawing on Arrighi’s taxonomy 
(1978), we move from the “informal” to “formal” exercise of international 
power, such as modern colonialism or imperialism, we find that 
participation in the exchange is of course no longer voluntary, and the 
loss of sovereignty and economic resources by subject countries is 
substantial. Nonetheless, the mother country still faces a number of 
costly international commitments towards subject countries as well as 
other countries.  
The fact that the exercise of international power imposes a 
constraint on the leader’s or emperor’s domestic choices is made clear by 
another economic textbook story. Insofar as resources are limited, any 
government is confronted by the alternative between producing butter 
or guns. If more guns are produced to meet international commitments, 
less butter is left for home taxpayers. Inwardness and pure domestic 
self-interest are not compatible with the pursuit of high international 
status. This is a recurrent theme in the culture of international powers, 
from Rome to Great Britain to the United States. Both the British and 
the US past experiences teach that international power may postpone 
the domestic butter-or-guns dilemma but cannot eliminate it in the 
long-run. As explained in the previous section, one way in which the 
excess of public expenditure (say guns and butter) over net private 
saving is remedied is by borrowing from abroad. This way out is only 
possible if there are other countries and/or private agents in the world 
which are willing to lend. Credit-worthiness may be largely supported 
by international status but it cannot be so indefinitely. Whatever the 
extent and intensity of the international status of a country, the law of 
power and strength should give way to the “law of the market”, which 
eventually imposes, sometimes painfully, a reconciliation between 
domestic economic choices and international political aspirations. 
(Gilpin (2003))8. The USSR, which strived not to be subject to the law of 
the market, ran up against the butter-guns trade-off rather quickly. 
 
4. Historical antecedents 
                                                
8 Ardant (1976) and Kindleberger (1984) provide vivid historical analyses 
showing this principle in action during the great European wars in the 
fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. 
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 The best way to grasp the implications of the general ideas put 
forward in the previous sections, and to introduce examination of  the 
present situation of the US, is to provide brief sketches of two major 
historical cases of the economic success and crisis of international 
powers: Great Britain and the Empire in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the US and its world leadership in the thirty years 
after World War II. 
 
4.1. Great Britain and the Empire, 1850-1914 
 In the second half of the nineteenth century, Great Britain 
reached the apogee of her international economic and political power. 
This status was to a large extent manifest in the formal and direct 
exercise of power over subject countries in an imperial system mostly 
located in the Eastern and Southern hemispheres. No less important, 
however, was a complex nexus of international relations also involving 
independent countries in the Western hemisphere. The relationship 
between Britain’s international economic and political stance is complex 
and provides an invaluable lesson on the economic sustainability of 
international political ambitions. 
 Great Britain entered her golden age as a leader in industry and 
trade, and as a world creditor country. In 1850 Britain held 25% − i.e. 
the largest share − of both world manufactured products and world 
trade. From 1860 to 1890 London invested some 1.3 billion pounds 
abroad, at a pace of 65 million a year. Between 1890 and 1914 foreign 
investment surged to 2.7 billion pounds, averaging 108 million each 
year. On the eve of World War I the British capital invested abroad 
amounted to about 4 billion pounds accounting for 45% of total foreign 
investment by major industrialized countries (Hobsbawm (1968), ch.7). 
Hobsbawm, like many others, argues that British international 
economic relations mostly developed independently of political power. If 
one looks at the geographical composition of foreign investment one 
indeed finds that up to 1870 territories under direct British control 
accounted for less than 35% of total investment, the remainder being 
concentrated in Southern Europe, North America and Latin America. 
Yet data on new issuances in London in the subsequent three decades 
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show that the concentration of foreign investment in controlled 
territories increased sharply, so that by the end of the century its 
geographical composition between dependent and independent countries 
was almost balanced (De Cecco (1975), p. 53, Hobsbawm (1968), table 
36).   
  A key institutional aspect of Britain’s relations with other 
independent countries was participation in the international monetary 
system known as “gold standard”. Formally, this was a system with gold 
as exclusive means of international payment, and currencies quoted in 
terms of gold, which resulted in mutually fixed exchange rates. The 
traditional wisdom in the international community was that gold 
reserves were critical, and that the BOP constraint was binding since 
payments imbalances would give rise to gold transfers from deficit to 
surplus countries. Summary data of Britain’s international payments 
are given in Table A1 in the Appendix9. From this viewpoint, the most 
striking feature was that Britain lost her supremacy in industry and 
trade. From 1850 to 1900 the British economy halved its share of world 
manufactured goods and never regained a surplus in the merchandise 
trade balance. The trade account was barely corrected by large 
remittances from transport services. How could a heavily capital 
exporting country with a worsening trade account survive the BOP 
constraint? The key to success was foreign incomes, as can be 
appreciated from  
                                                
9 Owing to a lack of reliable data, the capital account only displays long-run 
capital movements. 
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Figure 1. In an “average year”, interests and dividends were by 
themselves more than enough to compensate for the deficit in goods and 
services and for foreign investments10. The current account was 
consistently positive and tendentially increasing (see table A1 in 
Appendix). Hence, Britain was able to manage her BOP and maintain 
her commitment to gold as long as her economy was broadly consistent 
with the mature creditor, or international rentier, pattern discussed 
above . In parallel, Britain's mature debtor countries were able to 
service their debts thanks to their sales of goods to the mother country.  
Since the British BOP was tendentially positive, a stabilizing 
role was also increasingly played by short-term capital movements in 
paper sterlings from and to London. Overall, world gold reserves, and 
the British ones in  particular, were unable to keep pace with the 
growth rate of world trade. As a number of studies have pointed out, the 
gold standard was in fact turned into a sterling standard, with the 
British currency being largely used in international transactions and 
reserves instead of gold (Triffin (1969), Williams (1968), De Cecco 
(1975)). And as a rentier, Britain offered absolute security to those who 
came "even from the Moon" (McMillan Report) to deposit in London. 
Thus, a few basis points of increase in interest rates  sufficed to attract 
enough short-term capitals to rebalance overall payments.  
 
 
                                                
10 The available data do not allow identification of unilateral transfers in the 
incomes account. Government transfers were certainly substantial in relation 
to the imperial apparatus, although administrative costs were partly recovered 
from local administrations in the Dominions. The aggregate extent of military 
expenditure will be considered below. 
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Figure 1. Great Britain’s international accounts, 1870-1915 (year averages, 
millions of pounds) 
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 In a long-run perspective, however, the decline of Britain in 
international trade and her persistent trade deficits were fatal for the 
British world order. Its economic erosion  was due to a number of deep-
lying causes, prominent among which were obsolescence of technology, 
unfavourable specialization vis-à-vis emerging competitors in the free 
Western world, and import-dependent consumption habits. However, 
also political-economic macro-factors should be considered.  
Hobson’s analysis of the British Empire (1902) provided one of 
the earliest and clearest accounts of the “costs of the empire”, first, by 
dispelling the naive idea that empires are always built in the interest of 
the nation as a whole, and, second, by pointing out how the growing 
absortion of public expenditure by the foreign affairs apparatus, vis-à-
vis a declining GDP capacity, set the British economy on an 
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unsustainable path. Hobson consistently applied relationship (5) well 
before its appearance in economic textbooks. According to his data, from 
1870 to 1900 public expenditure rose from 61.7 to 128.7 million pounds, 
with the military share escalating from 31.9% to 53.5%, − i.e. three and 
a half times in nominal terms and more than four times in real terms11. 
The increasing costs of international power put the public budget under 
pressure, eventually forcing Victorian governments to abandon the 
cornerstones of the liberist tradition by introducing a heavier income 
taxation system and by resorting to borrowing. Debt financing of the 
military apparatus rose from almost nil in 1870 to about 50 million 
pounds before World War I (Hobsbawm (1968), ch. 12). Thus, in modern 
economic textbooks’ terms, the persistent British trade deficits were due 
to excess domestic real absorption in a vicious circle of upper-class 
consumption and investment trends sustained by foreign incomes, and 
of growing excess public expenditure necessary to support the global 
power that made high consumption, investment and foreign incomes 
possible.12  
It is remarkable that this system maintained a high degree of 
stability, given that its pivot was a chronically dependent country as to 
real resources. This situation, in fact, raises the question of 
sustainability: how long can a country live above its means? One 
stability factor was that Britain was not a debtor but a rentier: the flow 
of world rent necessary to sustain excess domestic real absorption was, 
to a great extent, guaranteed . Another factor was the Empire, a two-
edged sword by itself. I earlier used the term “vicious circle” to denote 
the role of military expenditure in the excess absorption mechanism; yet 
contemporaries would probably view it as a “virtuous circle”. Indeed, as 
the case of India shows, the Empire also offered a large area of 
administered and protected trade whereby the mother country was able 
to secure outlets for her goods and to shelter herself against the threats 
of free trade with emerging Western competitors. 
                                                
11 Hobsbawm ((1968), tab.43) reports similar figures. It should be noted that 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century saw a decline of prices in all major 
industrial countries. In Great Britain the general price index fell by about 25%. 
12 For a more detailed and analytical treatment of this process see Tamborini 
(1992). 
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 As suggested initially, political power may relax economic 
constraints or hide them from view. Nonetheless, they eventually 
become compelling. As is often the case, the alarm bell was rung by a 
sudden financial crisis. In summer 1914, on the eve of war, the 
sophisticated network of short-term capitals mastered by the London 
bankers broke down when, for the first time, London was unable to 
serve a massive withdrawal of liquid funds in sterling and gold by 
foreign depositors. Technically, the crisis was overcome in few days, but 
with hindsight we can say that it marked “the end of an era” (De Cecco 
(1975), ch. 7). Not only was the pre-war monetary order mortally 
wounded, but the unsustainability of Great Britain’s international 
political-economic stance became manifest. And after the war, as 
Keynes emphatically warned in his pamphlets (1931), the obdurate 
attempts by British governments to restore the vestiges of the past 
world order played a major role in destabilizing both the international 
system and their own country. 
 
4.2. The leadership of the United States after World War II, 1950-1973 
 One of the most famous interpretations of the inter-war political, 
economic and financial instability culminated in the 1929 crash and 
then in the World War is Kindleberger’s major book (1973), the keystone 
of which is the idea that the collapse of the British world order left a 
vacuum of political-economic leadership, with no country able to assume 
the pivotal role that would guarantee an orderly, growth-inducive, 
network of debtor-creditor positions as well as ensuring the supply of 
international public goods.  
The leading country that presided over the reconstruction of a 
sustainable world scenario after World War II was the United States. 
During the 1950s the US took an international economic stance similar 
to that of Great Britain examined in the previous paragraph − but with 
some crucial differences. In the aftermath of World War II, like Britain 
in post-Napoleonic Europe,  the US enjoyed a substantial industrial 
advantage over the rest of the world in terms of fixed capital, 
infrastructures, production capacity, and financial resources. Absent a 
formal empire, the role of leader of the victorious Allied Army was quite 
naturally extended and confirmed in the new confrontation against the 
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Communist bloc: economic supremacy went hand in hand with political 
leadership. Again, the new mix of leadership-cum-partnership on the 
Western front was sealed by a “monetary pact” quite similar to the gold-
sterling system centered in London one century before: the gold-dollar 
system of pegged exchange rates devised at Bretton Woods in 1944. 
 As can be seen from Table A2 in the Appendix, the gold-dollar 
system, too, was pinpointed by the dominant country as a world 
creditor, a young creditor however (see pattern (4)), with capital 
outflows averaging 500 million dollars per year vis-à-vis trade surpluses 
of 3.6 billion. Yet, in contrast to the typical creditor-country pattern, the 
incomes and transfers account was on average negative by 3.6 billion. 
This left a barely positive current account and an average BOP deficit of 
500 million each year, the seeds of a crucial problem in the US 
international stance. The available data allow us to distinguish, 
according to international accounting in Table 1, between incomes, 
largely due to interests and dividends on foreign investments, and 
unilateral transfers due to private and public non-market payments and 
obligations. Foreign incomes were indeed consistent with the creditor-
country pattern, showing a yearly positive balance of 1.4 billion dollars. 
Yet they were outweighed by substantial unilateral transfers abroad of 
5 billion, two-thirds of which were government payments. These figures 
are highly indicative of the US growing international military and non-
military commitments13. In other words, the US economy, as a 
consequence of domestic excess capacity, was transferring real and 
financial resources abroad to the benefit of the reconstruction and 
development of foreign partners, but the compound effect of foreign 
investments with military and non-military government commitments 
was too large relative to net export capacity.  
 
                                                
13 Military expenditures abroad averaged at 2.1 billion dollars per year with a 
fivefold increase in the decade (see Argy (1984), table 3.1). 
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Figure 2. The United States’ international payments, 1950-73 (billions of 
dollars) 
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 As shown by Table A2 and Figure 2, the 1960s replicated the 
same pattern in a context of apparent domestic and world stable 
growth. In reality, in the first half of the decade the fundamental 
imbalance of US payments dramatically deteriorated, falling to –1.4 
billion dollars per year in spite of further improvement in external trade 
and a positive current account. The BOP deficits were boosted by an 
upsurge of foreign investments and other capital outflows vis-à-vis an 
insufficient current account. A critical component of the current account 
was the rigidity of unilateral transfers. Either a cut in foreign 
investments and unilateral transfers or a cut in domestic absorption to 
improve foreign trade were necessary14. None of these corrections took 
                                                
14 The incidence and importance of unilateral transfers in US international 
payments revived research on a “minor” point of BOP theory, the so-called 
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place. Quite the contrary:  unlike Imperial Britain, the US economy was 
set on a path of declining and tendentially negative current account 
inconsistent with its role as world investor. Nonetheless, apart from 
minor disturbances, it was only at the end of the 1960s that the gold-
dollar system’s crisis was fully understood by markets and 
governments. The survival of this system for more than twenty years in 
spite of the pivot country’s unsustainable international stance was a 
variation on the theme of the economic benefits of international power 
that we have already met in the gold-sterling system.  
 The solution to the “guns vs. butter” dilemma adopted by the US 
in the 1950s and 1960s was another international transposition of the 
classical economic theory of the state: seignorage. Besides levying taxes, 
the state also has the monopolistic power to print money: indeed, 
printing money is the alternative means to pay for public expenditures. 
The US was able to practise seignorage worldwide thanks to the special 
status of the dollar as world means of payment and reserve. No foreign 
recipient of dollars would put the Federal Reserve under pressure to 
convert dollars back into other currencies or gold. Seignorage was one of 
the benefits of leadership that compensated the leader for the costs of 
providing defence for all, and at the same time it allowed the exchange-
rate system to survive. In  fact, as Argy (1984) stresses, in the 1950s the 
world overflow of dollars was probably “demand driven” as the fast 
growth of international trade generated demand for means of payments 
in excess of gold supply, and “dollar shortage” was one of the troubles of 
the time. However, this was no longer the case in the 1960s. Robert 
Triffin predicted ten years in advance the collapse of the international 
monetary system brought about by excess US seignorage, i.e. the 
unsustainable growth of paper dollars in the world relative to the US 
gold stock (Triffin, 1960). Dollar balances held by non-residents were 
short-term liabilities of the Fed, which should stand ready to convert 
them into gold on call. The mounting threat to the convertibility 
commitment is highlighted by two figures: in 1959 short-term liabilities 
amounted to 19.4 billion dollars and were 1:1 with gold reserves, in 
                                                                                                                          
“transfer problem” concerning whether BOP adjustment mechanisms exist 
such that a country can honour unilateral transfers: see e.g. Machlup (1963, 
1969), Johnson (1956, 1975, 1976), Kindleberger (1968). 
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1971 they amounted to 67.8 billions, more than 6 times the value of gold 
reserves. 
The inconsistency between the international political order based 
on the US leadership and what are now called the "underlying economic 
fundamentals" exploded in the second half of the 1960s on three fronts: 
the erosion of trade surpluses, the Vietnam War with the concomitant 
flood of dollars in the world markets, and the domestic economic 
downturn of 1968-69. These three developments raised conflicting 
objectives: sustainability of international commitments would call for a 
(strong) monetary-fiscal restrictive policy mix domestically, but recovery 
of the domestic economy would push in the opposite direction. The first 
objective was (mildly) pursued in the mid-1960s15, whereas the second 
one prevailed in the 1968-69 recession. This change of attitude was read 
by dollar-holders worldwide as the death certificate of the convertibility 
commitment, and indeed huge BOP deficits opened up in 1970 and 1971 
(−10.5 and −20.7 billion dollars, respectively). Speculative attacks 
against the dollar were triggered. The official breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods Agreements occured in August 1971 with a subsequent official 
devaluation of the dollar by 7.9%. In 1972 the US economy recovered, 
yet in February 1973 a further 10% devaluation was necessary, which 
in fact brought the trade account back to surplus and reduced the BOP 
deficit. In November, however, the first oil crisis broke out and 
definitively disrupted the post-war political-economic order. 
Overall, in spite of similarities in favourable factors (supremacy 
in industry and trade, world creditor position, gold-based fixed-
exchange-rate “monetary pact”) and in unfavourable ones (growing 
external-internal conflicting targets and long-run unsustainability of 
the BOP constraint) the US leadership model proved to be weaker and 
shorter-lived than the British imperial system. As a matter of fact, the 
latter was undermined by the slow erosion of the British world rent, but 
never was there substantial world payments imbalances. By contrast, 
the US proved unable, or unwilling, to correct the structural imbalance 
in her international payments, and blatantly resorted to seignorage 
                                                
15 The temporary recovery  of the BOP reported in 
 was largely due to monetary restrictions raising short-term interest 
rates and attracting short-term capital inflows (see also Table A2 in Appendix).  
Figure 2
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regardless of the “monetary pact”. To return to Kindleberger’s definition 
of international leadership, we may conclude that the US broke the rule 
that a leader must be ready to give priority to international 
commitments over domestic concerns. Indeed, the end of the coalition 
pact on which the post-war political-economic order rested was declared 
as early as 1968 by Charles De Gaulle and his central banker Jacques 
Rueff, when they announced that the privileges enjoyed by the US 
thanks to the international role of the dollar were “extravagant”  and 
“no longer acceptable”. 
 
5. Global power and global finance 
 
 The US retreated from international commitments and organized 
exercise of power after the events described in the previous section. Not 
surprisingly, neoconservatives are extremely critical of the lack of a 
grand view and of the piecemeal approach in foreign affairs of the 
1970s, for which they indict Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, let 
alone subsequent Administrations. This criticism seems unaware of the 
collapse of the economic conditions underlying the US leadership, and of 
the advent of conditions unfavourable to any other possible design of 
global governance. It is worth focusing  on one of these conditions, 
which the neoconservative view seems unable to fully comprehend: in a 
capitalist system, the exercise of international political power, no 
matter how large, is never fully unconstrained. I stressed at the outset 
that a country’s international political stance is feasible as long as it is 
consistent with a sustainable international economic pattern. Both the 
historical experiences examined above have shown that, although the 
extent of international power may relax economic constraints, they are 
nonetheless binding in the long run. This is unavoidable if international 
power is to be exerted within a frame of free market relationships with 
partners.  
 This general principle has been gaining further cogency in the 
last two decades: on the doctrinal side thanks to the advent of the so-
called “New Political Economics”, which advocates that governments be 
subject to the “market constituency” as the safeguard of the economic 
rationality of their choices (a conservative doctrine itself, by the way); 
and on the economic side as a consequence of the general phenomenon 
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of market globalization. Compared to the early post-war decades, when 
limits and controls on international transactions were much stricter and 
the driving capacity of markets by politics much stronger, nowadays the 
market conditioning of international political choices is likely to be 
strengthened. In short, global power has to come to terms with global 
finance. 
    Prior to the open endorsement of the neconservative doctrine 
by G. W. Bush, the US had already experienced the implications of 
financial globalization for international politics with the “Star Wars” 
programme under the Reagan Administration. President Reagan took 
office in 1981 and his economic programme was based on dismantling 
market protections and limitations , on the one hand, and on strong 
fiscal expansion through low taxes and high strategic expenditure, on 
the other. High strategic (military and non-military) expenditure also 
reflected an international political choice to restore the US to its role as 
world leader in the final attack against the Communist bloc. The 
rationale of the “Star Wars” programme was essentially to raise the cost 
of mutual deterrence so enormously as to shatter the USSR economy. In 
our metaphor, the “butter vs. guns” alternative would have strangled 
the USSR, whereas the US economy would have enjoyed “more butter 
and more guns”. Was this design accomplished? Who actually paid for 
the “Star Wars” programme? The answers to these questions provide a 
clear exemplification of the principles put forward so far. 
 First of all, the Reagan fiscal programme produced a sequence of 
large deficits escalating from 2.1% of GDP in 1981 to 5.2% in 1985 to 
return to 2.8% in 1988 (see Table 2). In the eight years of the two 
Reagan Administrations, defence expenditure rose costantly from 157 
billion dollars in 1981 to 290 in 1988, and it reached the historical 
peace-time peak of 6.2% of GDP in 1986. As explained in section 2, the 
international impact of the government budget can be viewed in real as 
well as financial terms. In real terms, it adds to the domestic absorption 
of resources of the private sector and hence co-determines the trade 
balance with the rest of the world (relation (5)). Since the private 
sector’s absorption was almost in balance or in surplus, the US 
experienced the so-called “twin deficits” phenomenon – that is, trade 
deficits vis-à-vis government deficits –  as can be seen in .  Figure 3
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Figure 3. US “twin deficits” and the real value of the dollar, 1980-02 (% of 
GDP) 
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In financial terms, as shown by relationship (6), fiscal deficits matter 
because they determine the borrowing requirement of the public sector; 
given net lending or borrowing (the saving-investment balance) of the 
private sector, the difference should result in net lending or borrowing 
with the rest of the world.  
 
 
Figure 4 reproduces the US financial accounts from 1981-88. The public 
sector borrowing requirement rose from 3.1 of GDP in 1981 to 9.3 in 
1986. In spite of a sustained net lending capacity of the private sector 
(excess of private saving over private investment) amounting to around 
5% of GDP, the consequence was an increasing external borrowing 
requirement which peaked at 5% of GDP in 1986.  
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Figure 4. US financial accounts, 1980-02 (% of GDP) 
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These real and financial tendencies set in motion by the US fiscal policy 
were eventually reflected in international accounts (see table A3 in the 
Appendix). Thus, the most striking feature of the first attempt to return 
to global power after the crisis of the 1970s, in the new context of global 
finance and floating exchange rates, was that the US had to take a 
typical world debtor position. In fact, trade deficits were covered by 
huge capital inflows, with a constant trend of unilateral transfers barely 
compensated by declining foreign incomes. Foreign incomes were 
declining as a consequence of the growing foreign debt service generated 
by external borrowing and by high interest rates paid by US Treasury 
bonds. The US had net foreign assets of 356 billion dollars in 1980, 
 32
which were reduced  to 10.4 in 1988, and then turned into net liabilities 
from 1989 onwards (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. US Net Foreign Position, 1980-2002 (billions of dollars) 
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The interesting question raised by the Reagan parable is 
whether the world political-economic leader can be a debtor. The lesson 
may be relevant to Bush as well. Recourse to global debt by the Reagan 
Administration was an alternative to seignorage16 in the attempt to by-
                                                
16 An important element in the picture is monetary policy. The new President 
of the Federal Reserve appointed by Reagan, Paul Volker, launched a U turn in 
monetary policy towards neo-monetarist principles. The growth rate of the 
money stock as a means to curb inflation became the pivot of the Fed’s policy. 
Volker introduced severe monetary restriction in 1981, which resulted in a 
slowdown of inflation with a sharp recession in 1982 (-2.1% of GDP). 
Subsequently, this strict adherence to the monetarist doctrine was relaxed, but 
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pass the domestic “butter vs. guns” trade-off by inducing partners to 
share the military effort. Yet, as stressed by Kindleberger ((1984), chs. 
12, 16), it is a recurrent faulty idea that the best financial policy to pay 
for wars is debt, on the illusion that this dispenses with the need to 
raise taxes. Debt is only a means to shift higher taxes, or lower non-
military expenditures, to the future: “[recourse to] debt is irrelevant to 
the question as to whether the country [can], or [cannot] pay for the 
war”, and to this effect “one has to take into account repercussions 
throughout the system (Kindleberger (1984), p.172)). The system, for a 
global player, is the world.  As explained in section 2, a world debtor has 
to pay higher interest rates and/or appreciate its currency in order to 
induce foreign lenders to accommodate increasing shares of its 
liabilities in their portfolios. From 1981 to 1985 the US recorded the 
most dramatic peace-time increase in nominal and real interest rates. 
In the same period, the dollar appreciated by 51.2% in real terms vis-à-
vis the US trading partners’ currencies. The other side of the coin was 
that high interest rates worsened the income account, while the strong 
dollar worsened the trade account, thereby widening the external 
borrowing requirement in a vicious circle. As to lenders, the world 
expansionary effect of US trade deficits was outweighed by the 
contractionary effect of financial resources absorption and high interest 
rates. The overall negative impact of the new US international stance 
was felt both in Europe, which experienced a twin spike in interest 
rates and unemployment (Fitoussi and Phelps (1988)), and in the 
developing countries, which were no longer able to meet their external 
dollar-denominated debt services (Strange (1998))17.  
The blatant financial unsustainability of the “Star Wars” 
programme on the one hand, and its negative effects on the partner 
economies on the other, disrupted the US new international stance in a 
handful of years. In June and October 1985 two meetings of the major 
                                                                                                                          
the Fed ceased to be a lender of last resort for the government, which was 
forced to finance budget deficits by issuing debt. 
17 Remember that, by contrast, in the post-war period US international lending 
and trade deficits, albeit structurally unbalanced, played a crucial role in 
recovering and sustaining world economic activity in a context of monetary 
stability, to the general benefit of partners.  
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industrialized countries “talked the dollar down”, thereby putting an 
end to the world lending-to-America frenzy and, at the same time, to the 
tale that America could do by herself. The legacy of Reagan’s global war 
finance experiment was the devastating third-world debt crisis of 1982-
85 and, as a final coup de theatre, the Wall Street crash of October 
1989. 
 The numerous analogies between Reagan’s and G.W. Bush’s 
global war finance programmes are evident. Both have taken place in a 
context of weak domestic economy, fiscal expansionary policies and  
large reliance on external debt. While aware of the pitfalls of historical 
analogies as guidance to future developments, it is nonetheless worth 
examining in greater detail the initial conditions of the two 
programmes. This task is helped by  Table 2, which summarizes a few 
selected economic indicators of the two Administrations vis-à-vis the 
previous Administration. 
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Table 2. Reagan and G.W. Bush Administrations. Selected indicators 
 Defence 
%  total 
exp. 
Defence 
% GDP 
Budget 
% GDP 
Debt 
% GDP 
Foreign 
% total 
GDP 
growth 
Reagan  
Prev. Adm.1 23.1 4.4 -2.2 27.2 19.2 3.4
Prev. year 22.7 4.8 -2.5 26.6 17.6 -0.2
1981 23.2 5.1 -2.5 26.6 16.5 2.5
1982 24.8 5.7 -4.5 30.6 15.1 -2.1
1983 26.0 6.0 -5.7 33.5 14.2 4.3
1984 26.7 5.8 -5.0 35.3 15.0 7.3
1985 26.7 6.1 -5.2 38.3 14.1 3.8
1986 27.6 6.2 -4.7 41.1 14.5 3.4
1987 28.1 6.0 -3.5 41.6 15.3 3.4
1988 27.3 5.7 -2.8 41.4 17.3 4.2
Bush 
Prev. Adm.1 16.4 3.1 1.2 41.4 32.5 4.2
Prev. Year 16.5 3.0 2.6 35.0 30.3 3.8
2001 16.4 3.0 0.9 33.9 31.0 0.3
2002 17.3 3.4 -2.6 35.1 33.2 2.5
2003 17.6 3.5 -3.7 37.3 n.a. 2.5
1Four year average 
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Table 2 (cont.d).  
  
Inflation 
Long int. 
rate 
 
REER1 
Trade 
account 
% GDP 
NFA2 
% GDP 
Reagan  
Prev. Adm.1 7.9 8.6 101.7 -1.1 16.2
Prev. year 9.2 10.8 98.4 -0.7 13.2
1981 5.1 12.9 107.9 -0.5 11.5
1982 5.7 12.2 125.5 -0.7 7.3
1983 6.0 10.8 132.9 -1.6 7.4
1984 5.8 12.0 142.1 -2.8 3.4
1985 6.1 10.8 148.8 -2.9 2.3
1986 6.2 8.1 126.5 -3.1 2.3
1987 6.0 8.7 113.9 -3.2 1.1
1988 5.7 9.0 107.5 -2.3 0.2
Bush 
Prev. Adm.1 1.7 5.8 117.0 -2.5 -12.8
Prev. Year 2.1 5.5 123.6 -3.8 -16.3
2001 2.4 5.3 129.9 -3.6 -23.1
2002 1.1 5.2 126.4 -4.0 -25.1
2003 1.9 4.8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1Four year average 
2 Real effective exchange rate (1995 = 100) 
3Net Foreign Assets 
 
Source: Economic Report of the President, Washington D.C., 2003; IMF, 
International Financial Statistics, CD-Rom. 
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 To begin with, let us point out possibly more fav urable 
conditions. First and foremost, Bush has inherited healthier public 
finances than Reagan: the overall budget was in surplus in 2000, public 
debt was diminishing, and defence expenditure was relatively low, in 
relation both to total expenditure and to GDP. These conditions allow 
greater room for manoeuvre than that available to the Reagan 
Administration. The impact of Bush’s military programme seems at the 
moment to be less dramatic than Reagan’s: even in 2003, the year of the 
Iraq war, defence expenditure (380 billion dollars) is estimated to reach 
17.6% of total expenditure and 3.5% of GDP,18 well below the peaks of 
28% and 6%, respectively, in 1986-87. The overall budget deficit is 
expected to be 3.7% of GDP in 2003 and between 4.5 and 5% in 2004, 
whereas it reached 5.7% in 1983.  
o
                                                
However, military and strategic expenditure during the Reagan 
Administration was almost entirely channelled to domestic research 
and investment aims, whereas the Bush Administration’s programme is 
far more complex and ambitious. It implies not only funding the 
domestic strategic apparatus, but also engaging in external military 
operations as well as non-military aids and transfers, the cost of which 
is not completely reflected in the defence budget and is still largely to be 
determined. Projections are extremely volatile and unreliable. As an 
example, prior to the Iraq war, the economist William Nordhaus19 
estimated that the military and non-military federal costs of the 
operation might range from 121 of 1595 billion dollars, depending on 
the length and difficulty of the war and post-war operations. The 
Administration itself has announced a target for the defence budget of 
451 billion dollars in 2007, with total expenditure  amounting to 2144 
billion dollars from 2002 to 2007. Assuming a 5% yearly increase in 
nominal GDP, the US would end up with defence expenditure absorbing 
about 5% of GDP in 2007, a figure in line with its order of magnitude in 
the 1980s. Overall, one may expect that the fiscal impact of the Bush 
programme will eventually be comparable with that of Reagan’s. 
18 In 1991-92, after the first Iraq war, defence reached 21.8% of total 
expenditure and 4.8% of GDP. 
19 New York Review of Books, December 5, 2002. 
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Let us now turn to a list of less favourable conditions than those faced 
by the Reagan Administration. These essentially affect the US 
borrowing capacity, and hence the long-term sustainability of the 
neoconservative programme. In this respect, Bush has inherited an 
international financial position of the country that was much harder, for 
his own purposes, than that inherited by Reagan. First of all, in 1980 
the US had net claims towards the rest of world of 378.7 billion dollars; 
at the end of the 1990s the US was one of the world’s largest debtors, 
with net liabilities amounting to 1588.7 billion dollars, 16.3% of GDP 
(see Figure 5). The US financial and international accounts in the 
second half of the 1990s displayed a pattern similar to that of the 1980s 
(see Figure 3 and Figure4) except that the driving force was not 
government deficits but the longest private investment and 
consumption cycles in post-war history. The private saving-investment 
balance has been shrinking since 1995 and has turned to negative since 
1998. With back-paddling government deficits, massive external 
borrowing has nonetheless been necessary to sustain the “new economy” 
investment bubble. High expected returns on stocks and capital inflows 
have set the dollar on a robust appreciation path; parallely, the trade 
account, after the recovery of the late 1980s, has pointed again towards 
larger and larger deficits, reaching the post-war record of 375 billion 
dollars (3.8% of GDP) in 2000. Large interest payments owed to foreign 
investors have added to trade imbalances to produce the concomitant 
current-account negative record of 421.3 billion dollars (4.3% of GDP). 
In the first three years of the Bush Administration, these tendencies 
have worsened further, with the government budget again taking the 
lead of financial imbalances. Thus, the neoconservative programme not 
only hinges on a replica of Reagan’s idea of global war finance, but it 
also presumes that the replicant can be a massive world debtor with 
yawning current-account deficits. 
The forces that can play against a world debtor maintaining the 
role of world power for a long time have already been discussed. As the 
foregoing analysis shows, from this viewpoint the Bush Administration 
has much less room for future manoeuvre than the Reagan 
Administration. International financial markets and policy-makers 
have already set in motion  the adjustment process of the US external 
position required by a mature debtor. The Fed keeps interest rates low, 
capital inflows are slowing down, and the dollar is depreciating to the 
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effect of correcting the current-account imbalances.  At the same time, 
the domestic absorption of real as well as financial resources should be 
reduced, which requires less consumption, more saving and balanced 
fiscal budgets. Thus, the US economy is now being driven through the 
same phase that followed the Reagan era in the late 1980s and early 
1990s: that is, the adjustment process that had to be managed by Bush 
sr. (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). Viewed in this perspective of financial 
phases, Bush jr.’s policy is, literally, “anachronistic”.  
It is highly unlikely that the mature-debtor phase of the US 
economy can be inverted, and any attempt to move in that direction  
would be fraught with danger to international stability. As after 1985, 
the “must” of world markets and policy-makers is now the so-called “soft 
landing” of the dollar. That is to say, depreciation of the dollar, 
reduction of capital inflows and improvement of the current account 
must be carefully tuned so that the mutual adjustment of the three 
variables occurs gently and smoothly. Along this path, little room is left 
for fiscal deficits. It is true that public debt is less than 15% of overall 
US foreign liabilities (but more than 30% of it is held abroad). 
Nonetheless, given the general tendency to reduce dollar-denominated 
assets in world portfolios, large loans to Washington would require a 
sharp increase in interest rates or, alternatively, massive monetization 
of federal deficits by the Fed − i.e. seignorage once again. The first 
alternative is precluded by three considerations. 1) High interest rates 
would create recessionary conditions and would defeat the effect of tax 
cuts which are the hallmark of Bush’s programme. 2) They would 
produce a fall in stock prices, which on the one hand would amplify 
recessionary conditions while on the other might trigger capital flights 
and attacks against the dollar. 3) They would also reduce the value of  
US T-bonds in world portfolios, and massive foreign sales of T-bonds 
would soon make financial and monetary policy in Washington 
unmanageable.   
The alternative to high interest rates represented by seignorage 
encounters no less serious obstacles. 1) Systematic monetization of fiscal 
deficits is nowadays strictly inhibited by central banking doctrines. 
Though the Fed has a tradition of pragmatism and flexbility, this policy 
would represent a U turn in its strategy and reputation, setting the 
clock back to the 1960s and 1970s, when, as explained previously, pro-
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seignorage US monetary policy was seen as one of the causes of the 
collapse of the world monetary system. 2) Consequently, fast growing 
money supply dictated by fiscal deficits would hardly be consistent with 
the “soft landing” strategy. Financial markets might read pro-
seignorage monetary policy as signalling that fiscal policy is 
unsustainable and react by selling T-bonds and speculating against the 
dollar.  
It seems fair to conclude that the smooth correction of the US 
mature debtor position now in progress sets fiscal policy on a narrow 
path, probably too narrow for the global war finance operations required 
by the neoconservative programme. Moreover, since politics has  not 
completely disappeared from the stage of world finance, it should also 
be borne in mind that a substantial share of the US T-bonds circulating 
in the world is bought and held by institutional investors in Japan, 
China and “old Europe”, that is to say countries which are quite 
moderately favourable to, or openly against, Bush’s foreign policy. Thus, 
in spite of the neoconservative ostentation of unilateralism, the new US 
international political stance should to some extent rely upon the 
financial benevolence of its opponents. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Current analyses of the neoconservative turn in US foreign 
policy tend to neglect its economic requirements and consequences.  
This is probably due to their long-run and uncertain nature, which 
stretches far beyond the accounting of the Afghan and Iraq campaigns. 
Yet one expects the foreign policy choices of a global power to be made 
with a clear understanding of their probable long-run economic costs 
and of their sustainability.  
The assessment of these economic implications presented in this 
paper has focused on the long-run sustainability of international 
political choices as determined by the ensuing international economic 
pattern of the country. The success of candidates to world governance in 
a frame of free market relations does not only depend on the extent of 
their political will or power. The fiscal counterpart of governments’ 
foreign policy interacts with the private sector’s saving and investment 
choices, co-determining the evolution of external trade and of external 
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borrowing or lending. Comparison with the historical experiences of 
world governance of pre-World-War-I Britain and post-World-War-II 
America has shown that financial sustainability of borrowing or lending 
positions is a crucial factor in the long run, and that no international 
political stance can withstand the “hard laws of markets” for long.  
We have seen that those systems of world governance remained 
sustainable as long as 1) both countries were world creditors, 2) their 
international commitments were contained within not too large fiscal 
imbalances, 3) their international economic positions were beneficial to 
their partners as well. America was still world creditor when President 
Reagan launched his global war finance venture, which however 
transformed the Americans into world debtors. The instrinsic fragility of 
that (comparatively) short-lived experience lay in the violation of all 
three previous successful conditions. President Bush’s fiscal counterpart 
of his foreign policy looks very similar to Reagan’s, with the major 
incovenience that he took office when the country was already the 
largest world debtor. As a consequence, Bush’s policy mix is confronted 
by two extremely difficult hurdles on international economic grounds. 
The first is that the US, in spite of the rhetoric of  uncompromised 
unilateralism, is a country under external financial dependence, with 
the opponents of its foreign policy in possession of most of the financial 
means. The second is that, as a matter of fact, international financial 
markets and policy-makers (Fed included) are already driving the US 
economy along an adjustment path where little room is left for the large 
global war finance operations required by the neoconservative 
programme.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Great Britain’s international payments, 1870-1915 (millions of pounds; selected items, year averages) 
 1871-75 1876-80 1881-85 1886-90 1891-95 1901-05 1906-10 1911-15
TRADE ACCOUNT (a) 25.6 -32.6 -8.3 1.2 -38.5 -71.8 -3.9 23.8
   Merchandise, net -19.3 -78.9 -56.4 -44.3 -84.4 -115.0 -79.1 -61.3
   Services, net 44.9 46.3 48.1 45.5 45.9 43.2 75.2 85.1
INCOMES ACCOUNT (a) 50.0 56.3 64.8 84.2 94.0 113.0 151.4 188.0
        
CAPITAL ACCOUNT        
 Foreign investments (b) -61.0 -1.7 -23.9 -61.1 -45.6 -21.3 -109.5 -185.0
 
Source: (a) De Cecco (1975), (b) Feis (1930)  
 
 Table A2. United States’ international payments, 1959-73 (billions of dollars) 
 1950-59 
(a) 
1960-64 
(a) 
1965-69 1970 1971 1972 1973
1.TRADE ACCOUNT 3.6 5.7 3.2 3.2 -1.4 -5.5 3.0
   Merchandise, net … 5.4 2.6 2.6 -2.3 -6.4 0.9
   Services, net … 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.9 2.1
2.INCOMES & 
TRANSFERS ACC. 
-3.6 -1.5 -0.7 -0.8 0.0 -0.2 4.2
   Incomes 1.4 1.2 2.2 2.6 3.8 3.8 8.2
   Unilateral Transfers -5.0 -2.7 -2.8 -3.4 -3.8 -4.0 -4.0
3.CURRENT ACCOUNT 
(1+2) 
0.0 4.2 2.5 2.4 -1.4 -5.7 7.2
       
4.CAPITAL ACCOUNT -0.5 -5.7 -0.7 -12.9 -19.3 -3.7 -9.7
   Foreign investments … -4.3 -3.8 -6.4 -9.1 -6.2 -6.9
   Short term capitals … -1.3 3.2 -6.5 -10.2 2.5 -2.8
5.FUNDAMENTAL BOP 
(3+4) 
-0.5 -1.4 1.9 -10.5 -20.7 -9.4 -2.5
(a) year average 
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Washington DC, CD-Rom Database 
 
 
 Table A3.  United Sates’ international payments and net foreign position, 1980-90 (billions of dollars) 
  1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
1.TRADE ACC. -18.9 -15.7 -23.5 -57.1 -108.3 -121.1 -138.5 -151.7 -114.7 -93.1 -80.9
  Merchandise,net -25.5 -28.0 -36.5 -67.1 -112.5 -122.2 -144.6 -159.2 -126.6 -117.0 -110.3
   Services, net 6.6 12.4 13.0 10.0 4.2 1.1 6.1 7.6 12.0 23.92 29.41
2.INCOMES &   
TRANS. ACC. 
22.1 24.9 20.3 21.3 17.9 4.8 0.2 0.9 5.1 -6.0 -4.7
  Incomes 29.6 32.4 29.2 30.8 30.0 19.8 15.5 14.3 18.7 19.8 28.56
 Unilateral Transf. -7.5 -7.5 -8.9 -9.5 -12.1 -15.0 -15.3 -13.4 -13.6 -25.8 -33.2
3.CURRENT  
ACCOUNT (1+2) 
3.2 9.2 -3.3 -35.8 -90.4 -116.3 -138.4 -150.8 -109.6 -99.2 -85.5
           
4.CAPITAL ACC. -20.7 -26.0 -25.0 23.0 80.8 105.2 118.0 160.2 143.9 74.8 62.4
 Foreign invest. 8.3 31.0 23.0 4.5 37.4 74.5 92.9 85.1 101.1 98.44 4.53
 Short term cap. -29.0 -57.0 -48.0 18.5 43.4 30.7 25.0 75.1 42.8 -23.61 57.91
5.FUNDAMENTAL  
BOP (3+4) 
-17.6 -16.7 -28.3 -12.8 -9.6 -11.1 -20.4 9.4 34.3 -24.3 -23.1
           
6. NET FOREIGN 
POSITION 
365.5 356.1 235.9 257.4 134.1 96.9 100.8 50.5 10.5 -47.0 -164.5
   Assets 755.4 820.1 961.0 1129.7 1127.1 1302.7 1594.7 1758.7 2008.4 2350.2 2294.1
   Liabilities 389.9 464.0 725.1 872.3 993.0 1205.8 1493.9 1708.2 1997.9 2397.2 2458.6
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Washington DC, CD-Rom Database 
 
 
 Table A4. United States’ international payments and net foreign position, 1991-2002 (billions of dollars) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1. TRADE ACC. -31.2 -38.2 -69.2 -97.2 -95.1 -102.8 -107.1 -163.1 -261.2 -375.4 -357.8 -418.0
  Merchandise,net -75.7 -95.1 -130.6 -163.8 -172.3 -189.1 -196.2 -244.7 -343.7 -449.8 -424.1 -479.4
  Services, net 44.51 56.94 61.38 66.57 77.26 86.26 89.11 81.6 82.5 74.41 66.3 61.34
2. INCOMES 
& TRANS. ACC. 
30.4 -10.4 -14.1 -22.2 -11.0 -15.0 -21.7 -42.3 -34.5 -36.9 -37.0 -64.1
  Incomes 24.13 23.31 24.33 17.08 25.07 24.54 20.68 6.92 17.11 19.61 10.69 -3.97
 Unilateral Transf. 6.3 -33.7 -38.4 -39.3 -36.1 -39.5 -42.3 -49.2 -51.6 -56.5 -47.7 -60.1
3. CURRENT 
ACCOUNT (1+2) 
-0.8 -48.6 -83.3 -119.4 -106.1 -117.8 -128.7 -205.4 -295.7 -412.3 -394.8 -482.2
            
4. CAPITAL ACC. 40.6 92.3 82.9 124.6 95.9 130.5 220.2 82.5 227.8 456.6 420.5 531.7
 Foreign invest. -2.86 -5.65 -67.82 45.05 46.86 177.5 214.9 99.76 233.8 460.1 372.0 339.0
 Short term cap. 43.49 97.99 150.7 79.55 49.05 -47.05 5.28 -17.25 -6.05 -3.52 48.44 192.6
5. FUNDAMENTAL 
BOP (3+4) 
39.8 43.7 -0.3 5.2 -10.2 12.7 91.5 -122.9 -67.9 44.4 25.7 49.5
            
6. NET FOREIGN 
POSITION 
-260.8 -452.3 -144.3 -123.7 -343.3 -386.5 -835.2 -1094. -1068. -1588. -2314. -2605.
   Assets 2470.6 2466.5 3091.4 3326.7 3930.3 4631.3 5379.1 6174.5 7390.5 7393.7 6891.3 6473.6
   Liabilities 2731.5 2918.8 3235.7 3450.4 4273.6 5017.8 6214.3 7268.6 8459.2 8981.8 9205.5 9078.7
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Washington DC, CD-Rom Database 
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